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AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON TAKEOUT
MENUS: NEW YORK’S LAWN LITTER LAW
Brooks H. Leonard ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nothing is more annoying than coming home and finding a pile
of restaurant takeout menus on your doorstep. But that annoyance
can soon fade to relief when you realize there is nothing to eat in
your fridge and dinner is just a phone call away. Whether it is an
enormous soda ad that blocks out the sun or an 8½ x 11-inch tri-fold
pamphlet displaying a new restaurant’s menu, Americans have a lovehate relationship with advertising. On the one hand, advertising is a
driving force behind our capitalist economy. On the other, the country is saturated with it and longs to tune it out. Although appealing
when entertaining, advertising at the same time is loathed for its omnipresence. So much, in fact, that people—annoyed citizens and
lawmakers alike—tend to forget that advertising is protected under
our Constitution.
Historically, a struggle has occurred between organizations asserting their First Amendment right to advertise and individuals
claiming that their privacy interests protect them from unwanted dis1
tractions. On a basic level, some citizens simply do not want to be
bothered by the exposure to excess commercial information. But
many businesses depend on advertising as an important method of
attracting customers, and small businesses cannot always feasibly sell
their products to the masses by large-scale means. Thus, businesses
are constantly directing their marketing campaigns toward potential
customers in budget-friendly ways. One cost-effective method that

∗

J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A., 2005, Indiana University;
B.A., 2003, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like to thank Professor Angela Carmella, Seton Hall University School of Law, for her invaluable assistance in preparing this Comment. Thanks also go to my wife and family, without
whose support this endeavor would not have been possible.
1
See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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2

businesses use is circulating handbills or flyers. This method is inexpensive; businesses generally only incur printing costs and the nominal expenses associated with hand delivery. Handbills in the form
of takeout menus are especially prevalent in the restaurant business.
Unfortunately for these businesses, many citizens particularly
3
dislike this method of advertising. Instead of passively subjecting a
television viewer or radio listener to an advertisement that the viewer
or listener can simply tune out, a handbill’s physical presence necessitates an active response. One must actually do something with the
advertisement upon receipt. If the government has a duty to protect
its citizens, the problem seems easy enough to fix—implement an
outright prohibition of this type of business advertising. It would be
logical to allow citizens to exclude these types of advertisements from
their property. This is exactly what the City of New York (or the
“City”) has done.
In 2007, the New York State Legislature passed a law that prohibits a person from placing advertising materials on private property if
the owner of the property has posted a sign prohibiting such mate4
rials. Although this legislation might have the effect of reducing litter, keeping our streets cleaner, and decreasing annoyance to citi5
zens, it inescapably violates the First Amendment rights of
businesses. The State of New York completely disregards that the
Constitution protects commercial speech almost to the same extent
6
as it protects noncommercial speech.
This Comment uses the example of takeout menus to argue that
New York General Business Law § 397-a (“Lawn Litter Law”) violates

2
Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 (“Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to
the poorly financed causes of little people.”).
3
See John J. Doherty, Lawn Litter Law, QUEENS COURIER, Aug. 6, 2008,
http://www.queenscourier.com/articles/2008/08/06/news/opinion/op_ed/news0
1.txt. John J. Doherty currently serves as the New York City Commissioner of Sanitation. Id.
4
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 397-a(1) (Consol. 2007 & Supp. 2009). The law reads as
follows:
In any city with a population of one million or more, no person shall
place, or cause or permit to be placed on private property any unsolicited papers, fliers, pamphlets, handbills, circulars, or other materials
advertising a business or soliciting business where the owner has posted, in a conspicuous location, a sign stating that the placement of such
materials shall be prohibited.
Id.
5
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.”).
6
See infra Part 0.
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the principles of the commercial speech doctrine. Under the commercial speech doctrine, the Central Hudson test mandates that any
regulation that limits nonmisleading commercial speech must be
7
supported by a substantial governmental interest. Furthermore, the
regulation must directly advance this interest and must not be more
8
extensive than necessary. The City of New York has advanced five interests justifying the Lawn Litter Law: litter, crime, safety, nuisance,
9
and privacy. This Comment argues that although preventing crime,
keeping citizens safe, and protecting citizens’ privacy are substantial
interests, keeping the streets free from litter and preventing nuisance
are not substantial interests. Furthermore, even if all five of the City’s
interests could be considered substantial, the Lawn Litter Law is unconstitutional because it does not directly advance the stated interest,
because it is more extensive than necessary, or because of both such
reasons. That is, for each of its asserted interests, the City fails the
Central Hudson test on at least one of the four prongs.
This Comment concludes that because the Lawn Litter Law does
not withstand analysis under the relevant test, it is unconstitutional.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the Lawn Litter Law
from its passage by the New York State Legislature to its implementation by the City. This section also discusses the structure and meaning of the law. Part III outlines the development of the First
Amendment jurisprudence relevant to commercial speech starting
with the decision to extend free-speech protection to commercial
speech. Part IV analyzes the Lawn Litter Law from the perspective of
the commercial speech doctrine, discusses other implications of the
law, and addresses some ways to advance the governmental interests
that do not infringe on the commercial speech rights of businesses.
Part V argues that the New York Legislature should amend the Lawn
Litter Law to both serve the interests of the government and conform
to the Constitution.

7
Id. This Comment assumes that the business advertisements at issue are not
misleading.
8
Id.
9
DEP’T OF SANITATION, CITY OF N.Y., NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF FINAL RULES
GOVERNING THE DISTRIB. OF ADVER. ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–5, available at
www.nyc.gov/html/dsny/downloads/pdf/rules/noa/llrule.pdf.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK’S LAWN LITTER LAW
A. The Passage of the Lawn Litter Law
On August 15, 2007, the representatives in New York’s Senate
and Assembly voted to amend the General Business Law through the
10
addition of a new section. The legislature passed this amendment to
the General Business Law as Chapter 585 of the 2007 laws of New
11
York State. Assembly Members representing all five boroughs of
12
New York City introduced this bill. Both the Assembly and the Senate passed the bill, which the Governor subsequently signed into
13
law; the Legislature later amended the law.
The core addition to the General Business Law was that the new
section prohibited the distribution of unsolicited business advertisements on private property; section 585 applied only to cities with a
population of one million or more people and provided specifically
that
no person shall place, or cause or permit to be placed on private
property any papers, fliers, pamphlets, handbills, circulars, or
other materials advertising a business or soliciting business where
the owner has posted a sign stating that the placement of such
materials shall be prohibited unless expressly permitted in writing
14
by the owner of such private property.

On the same day that the legislature passed the law, Governor
Eliot Spitzer issued a memorandum that noted certain deficiencies in
15
it. Governor Spitzer observed that some property owners in New
York City were “frustrated by the inconvenience, nuisance and litter
caused by the repeated delivery of unwelcome advertising circulars to
16
their property.” But the memorandum also suggested that some
areas of the bill needed work to bring the bill in line with First
17
Amendment jurisprudence. These concerns included that the bill
permitted landlords to “bar tenants from receiving advertising circu10

See 2007 N.Y. Laws 585, § 1.
Id.
12
Id. The members of the Assembly who introduced the bill were Mark Weprin
(Queens County), James F. Brennan (Kings County), Barbara M. Clark (Queens
County), Rory I. Lancman (Queens County), Andrew Hevesi (Queens County),
Naomi Rivera (Bronx County), Aurelia Greene (Bronx County), and Keith L.T.
Wright (New York County).
13
See 2008 N.Y. Laws 3.
14
Id.
15
Governor’s Approval Memorandum, 2007 N.Y. Laws 34.
16
Id.
17
Id.
11
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lars,” placed small or new businesses at a financial disadvantage by
requiring them to use other advertising means, failed to name an enforcement mechanism or enforcement agency, and lacked a standard
18
for a property owner’s notice of prohibition. The Governor signed
the bill into law in spite of its deficiencies because of the legislature’s
19
noted willingness to amend the law as soon as possible.
As a result of the Governor’s memorandum, the legislature
amended the law on January 28, 2008, to incorporate some of the
20
proposed changes. Senator Padavan of Queens County, a county
21
purportedly plagued by advertising litter, sponsored this amend22
ment. The changes to the law required a property owner to post the
sign “in a conspicuous location” if he wished to prohibit the mate23
rials. The amendment clarified the rights of owners as well as ren24
ters and established guidelines for the format of the sign. Moreover,
the amendment provided that the mayor of the city is to designate an
enforcement agency to promulgate rules for the law’s implementa25
tion. Finally, the amendment clarified the civil penalties for viola26
tions and the notice required for each violation. The law took effect
27
on November 15, 2007; ninety days after Governor Spitzer signed it.
Each city seeking to implement the law, however, is required to have
the enforcement agency in place before issuing violations and collect28
ing fines.
B. The Lawn Litter Law’s Statutory Structure
Section 1 of the Lawn Litter Law sets out the prohibition of
commercial advertising materials and establishes rights for property
29
owners and lessees. This law only applies to cities with a population
30
of one million or more people. The law provides that no one shall
18

Id.
Id.
20
See 2008 N.Y. Laws 3, § 1.
21
See Doherty, supra note 3.
22
See S.B. 6477, 2008 Leg., 231st Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
23
2008 N.Y. Laws 3, § 1.
24
See id.
25
Id.
26
See id.
27
Id. § 2.
28
Id.
29
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 397-a(1) (Consol. 2007 & Supp. 2009).
30
Id. As of July 1, 2006, the only city in New York State that meets this requirement is New York City. U.S. Census Bureau, New York—Place and County Subdivision, Population Estimates, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?19
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“place, or cause or permit to be placed on private property any materials advertising a business or soliciting business” if the owner has
31
placed a sign on the property prohibiting such material. The property owner or manager must place the sign in a “conspicuous loca32
tion.” If the property is owner occupied and is either a single-family
home or is designed for and used by no more than three families, on33
ly the owner of the building has the authority to post the sign. For
all other multiple-family dwellings, the owner or manager has the authority to post the sign only if every owner or lessee in the building
34
agrees to prohibit the specified materials.
A sign is invalid under the law if one of the owners or lessees of a
35
building fails to consent to its posting. If at least one owner or lessee in the building does not wish to prohibit such material, the owner
of the property may post a sign that designates a place for unsolicited
36
advertising. The sign must specify the number of owners or lessees
who do not wish to prohibit the advertising, and the owner must
permit the advertiser to leave only that number of copies in the des37
ignated receptacle. The receptacle must be “reasonably accessible”
38
to the owners or lessees and to the advertisers. Notably, this law
does not prohibit any materials that come through the United States
39
Postal Service, including “sample copies of newspapers regularly
40
sold by the copy or by annual subscription or sale” and “coupon
newspapers and magazines containing more than a deminimus
41
amount of news that are published at least weekly.”
Section 2 describes the minimum requirements for the appear42
ance of the sign. The sign must be five inches tall and seven inches
43
wide with the lettering on the sign at least one inch tall. The sign
ds_name=PEP_2006_EST&-mt_name=PEP_2006_EST_GCTT1R_ST9S&geo_id=04000US36&-format=ST-9&-tree_id=806&-context=gct (last visited July 10,
2010).
31
§ 397-a(1).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
§ 397-a(1).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
§ 397-a(2).
43
Id.
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must read, “Do Not Place Unsolicited Advertising Materials On This
44
Property.” Where a multiple-family building has owners who do not
wish to prohibit the advertising, the sign (following the above specifications) must designate how much material the advertiser is permitted to leave and the particular location at which the advertiser may
45
place it.
46
Section 3 sets out a presumption for the violation of this law. It
creates a rebuttable presumption that the “person whose name, telephone number, or other identifying information appears on any unsolicited advertising materials” placed at two or more premises is lia47
ble for violating the Lawn Litter Law.
48
Section 4 relates to penalties. The mayor chooses the agency
49
responsible for enforcing the law. Section 4 imposes a civil penalty
of no less than $250 and not more than $1000 for each violation, but
50
the total amount of the penalty may not exceed $5000 for one day.
Furthermore, “[e]ach unauthorized placement of materials at a single location where a sign is posted . . . shall be considered a separate
51
violation of this section.” The environmental control board of the
city has the authority to impose the civil penalty provided that suffi52
cient notice of the violation was given. Moreover, Section 4 requires
that all of the penalties collected be “paid into the general fund of
53
[the] city.”
Finally, Section 5 authorizes the mayor’s selected agency “to
54
promulgate rules to effectuate these provisions.”
C. Enacting the Lawn Litter Law in New York City
On February 20, 2008, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
appointed the New York City Department of Sanitation (DSNY) as

44

Id.
Id.
46
§ 397-a(3).
47
Id. Currently, legislation is pending in the Senate that would delete this presumption’s requirement that the material be placed at two or more locations. A.B.
7862, 2009 Leg., 232nd Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
48
§ 397-a(4).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
§ 397-a(5).
45
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the enforcement agency for the Lawn Litter Law. The DSNY then
56
proposed a series of rules to implement the law and set the penalty
57
for each violation at $250. The original proposal for this law required owners who wished to report violations to provide a notarized
58
affidavit with the complaint. After receiving considerable negative
feedback from the public, however, the DSNY decided to require only
59
a signed affidavit.
On August 5, 2008, the DSNY began enforcing the Lawn Litter
60
Law. The public has reacted favorably to the law, especially after the
61
DSNY eliminated the notary requirement. Although some believe
that the law is an effective way to solve the litter problem, others
62
doubt that the government will enforce it. Clearly, many businesses
63
are displeased with the law. But some business owners maintain that

55

DEP’T OF SANITATION, CITY OF N.Y., NOTICE OF PUB. HEARING AND OPPORTUNITY
TO COMMENT ON: PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING THE DISTRIB. OF ADVER. ON PRIVATE
PROPERTY 3 (June 4, 2008), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dsny/
downloads/pdf/rules/lawn_litter/transcripts/transcript.pdf.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 10:7.
58
DEP’T OF SANITATION, CITY OF N.Y., NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF FINAL RULES
GOVERNING THE DISTRIB. OF ADVER. ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 5, available at
www.nyc.gov/html/dsny/downloads/pdf/rules/noa/llrule.pdf.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Sue Wolfe, Lawn Litter Be Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008, at 9 (“We are
delighted that the city has started enforcing a recent state law that prohibits ‘lawn
litter’ if a property owner has posted a sign saying such materials are not wanted.”).
61
Frank Lombardi, Li’l Lawn Litter Relief. Law Fines Advertisers for Unwanted Material, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 7, 2008, at 53 (“In a major regulatory change . . . property owners will not have to get their complaints notarized. That proposed rule was
dropped by the Sanitation Department because it would have put an undue burden
on property owners.”); see also ‘Lawn Litter Law’ Final Rules Established, 877 JUNK LAW,
2008, http://www.
877junklaw.org/lawn-litter-law-final-rules-established/ (quoting New York State Senator Frank Padavan as saying that “I commend the City and the Department of Sanitation for working in good faith and making the complaint and enforcement process
of the ‘Lawn Litter Law’ easier for homeowners throughout the five boroughs”).
62
Richard Gentilviso, Lawn Litter Law Poses Enforcement Problems, QUEENS GAZETTE,
Sept. 24, 2008, at 22, available at http://www.qgazette.com/news/2008-0924/features/026.html (“[Department of Sanitation] Assistant Chief for Enforcement
Todd Kuznitz said there are still problems with the law. ‘It is a difficult law to enforce,’ he said at the September meeting of the Queens Borough Cabinet. ‘The
problem is First Amendment rights.’”).
63
Sewell Chan, An Effort to Halt Unwanted Paper Deliveries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008,
at B1 (“Business owners expressed displeasure with the law. ‘It’s not good,’ said Linda Chang, manager of the Hunan Wok, a Chinese restaurant in Park Slope [Brooklyn]. ‘I believe I lose something, and the customer loses something, too. Some
people enjoy the fliers. Not many people complain to us.’”).
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the law has not affected them because they have progressed from
64
door-to-door advertising to advertising over the Internet.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. The Origins of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
In 1942, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
65
First Amendment did not protect commercial speech. In Valentine
v. Chrestensen, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a sanitation
statute that prohibited “distribution in the streets of commercial and
66
business advertising matter.” The Court reasoned that the legislature could regulate commercial advertising because the Constitution
67
does not specifically provide otherwise. In Chrestensen, the legislature did not have to permit what it believed was the interference with
and undesirable invasion of the people’s right to fully and freely use
68
public roads for their intended purpose.
The Supreme Court did not decide that the Constitution protects commercial speech until 1976. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court struck down a portion of the Virginia Code that deemed a licensed pharmacist as
engaging in unprofessional conduct upon “publish[ing], advertis[ing] or promot[ing], directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit
terms . . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescrip69
tion.” If the Board found a licensed pharmacist guilty of unprofessional conduct, it could revoke the pharmacist’s license or impose a

64

Joyce Hanson, New Leaflet Law No Big Deal, Say Restaurateurs, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUSINESS,
Aug.
8,
2008,
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20080808/FREE/126587351/1040/breaking. The article explains,
But the restaurant industry, a target of the new law, is seemingly not
worried. Many restaurateurs who do a lot of delivery business say the
law won’t affect them because they stopped dropping leaflets years ago.
“Today, it’s all on the Internet,” says Antonio Assenso, owner of midtown Manhattan trattoria La Cucina Di Antonio. “We don’t need to
leave fliers.”
Id.
65
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”).
66
Id. at 53.
67
Id. at 54.
68
Id. at 54–55.
69
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
749–50 (1976) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974)).
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70

civil monetary penalty.
Because only licensed pharmacists could
lawfully dispense these drugs in Virginia, all pharmacist advertising
71
was essentially prohibited. Interestingly, this suit was brought not by
pharmacists but by consumers suffering from diseases that required
72
daily prescription drugs.
The consumers claimed that the First Amendment entitled consumers of prescription drugs to obtain pricing information from
73
pharmacists through advertising. The Court acknowledged that the
74
First Amendment protects the right to receive information. Furthermore, the Court stated that “[i]f there is a right to advertise,
there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be as75
serted by these [consumers].” In arguing that commercial speech is
outside the realm of First Amendment protection, the Board cited
76
Chrestensen. The Court recognized that commercial speech had traditionally been an exception to First Amendment protection, but it
also suggested that more recent cases had not been faithful to this
77
proposition. The Court framed the issue as whether commercial
78
speech falls outside of First Amendment protection.

70

Id. at 752.
Id.
72
Id. at 753.
73
Id. at 754.
74
Id. at 757 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972)).
75
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757.
76
See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
77
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759–60. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975), the Court explained,
[T]he holding [in Chrestensen] is distinctly a limited one: the ordinance
was upheld as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed. The fact that it had the effect
of banning a particular handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune from constitutional challenge. The case obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising is
unprotected per se. This Court’s cases decided since Chrestensen clearly
demonstrate as untenable any reading of that case that would give it so
broad an effect.
Id. at 819–20; see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“There is some doubt concerning whether the ‘commercial
speech’ distinction announced in [Chrestensen] retains continuing validity.”) (citation
omitted); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513–14 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“[Chrestensen] . . . held that business advertisements and commercial
matters did not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth. The ruling was casual, almost offhand.”).
78
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760–61.
71
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The Court answered that commercial speech is not “so removed
79
from any ‘exposition of ideas[]’ . . . that it lacks all protection.” In
addition, the Court stated that simply because an advertiser’s interest
is economic does not mean its First Amendment protection is abro80
gated. Furthermore, the Court found two additional factors that
weighed in favor of allowing advertising: the consumers had a general
interest in the free flow of commercial information, and the individ81
uals most affected by the statute were the poor, sick, and elderly.
The Court also found that society has an “interest in the free flow of
82
commercial information” to facilitate “intelligent and well in83
formed” decisions.
On the other hand, the Court also acknowledged interests in favor of prohibiting this type of advertising. It noted that advertising
might prevent pharmacists from giving professional services in the
84
“compounding, handling, and dispensing of prescription drugs.”
Moreover, the Court hypothesized that advertising might lead to lower prices, which could run “the more painstaking and conscientious
85
pharmacists” out of business. The majority stated that advertising
would lead to price shopping and result in a loss of “stable pharmac86
ist-customer relationships.” Finally, the Court suggested that adver87
tising would damage the “professional image of the pharmacist.”
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the justifications for
prohibiting advertising were based on “the advantages of [the con88
sumers] being kept in ignorance.” These justifications reinforced
that the First Amendment protects the free flow of this type of infor89
mation. The Court, however, limited its holding by stating that it
“[does] not hold that [commercial speech] can never be regulated in
90
any way.” That is, the government may still regulate commercial

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 762 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 765.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 767–68.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 770.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
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speech by time, place, and manner restrictions in addition to regula91
tions based on whether the speech is in any way false or misleading.
B. The Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine Under Central Hudson
The Supreme Court established the modern test for commercial
speech protection in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser92
vice Commission of New York. This case arose out of an appeal of the
New York Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold a complete ban on
93
advertisements of electricity services. The Court began by addressing the protection of commercial speech generally as decided in Vir94
ginia State Board of Pharmacy. It explained that the Constitution affords a “lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
95
constitutionally guaranteed expression.” The Central Hudson Court
stated that the First Amendment concern at issue involved the “in96
formational function of advertising.” The Court established that as
long as the commercial speech is not misleading or related to an unlawful activity, the power of the government to regulate that speech is
97
limited. A state seeking to regulate this speech must first “assert a
98
substantial interest” for doing so. The regulation “must be in pro99
portion to that interest” and “must be designed carefully to achieve
100
the State’s goal.” The Court established two criteria for this last requirement: “[T]he restriction must directly advance the state interest
involved[,] . . . [and] if the governmental interest could be served as
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the exces101
sive restrictions cannot survive.”
Essentially, the Court set out a
four-part test for commercial speech: (1) the speech “must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading,” (2) the governmental interest
must be substantial, (3) the regulation must directly advance that go-

91

Id. at 771.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 562; see also Part III.A.
95
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 564.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
92
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vernmental interest, and (4) the regulation must not be more exten102
sive than necessary.
The Court applied this test to the facts before it and established
that no allegation was made that the speech was either misleading or
103
that it related to unlawful activity. The State asserted two interests
for its ban on promotional advertising: energy conservation and a
104
concern that rates be fair and efficient. The Court concluded that
105
both of these governmental interests were substantial.
The Court
then turned to “the relationship between the State’s interests and the
106
advertising ban.” As to the second asserted interest, “the impact of
promotional advertising on the equity of appellant’s rates [was] high107
ly speculative,” and this could not justify restricting the speech at
108
issue. On the other hand, the State’s interest in conserving energy
109
was directly advanced by the ban because “[t]here is an immediate
110
connection between advertising and demand for electricity.”
After suggesting that the fourth prong of the test was the most
critical issue in the case, the Court concluded that the energyconservation rationale did not justify the outright ban on all promo111
tional advertising.
The ban prevented the advertisement of “electric services that would reduce energy use by diverting demand from
less efficient sources, or that would consume roughly the same
112
amount of energy as do alternative sources.”
Moreover, the government did not demonstrate that a more limited regulation was in113
adequate to protect its conservation interest. The Court concluded
that it was not overlooking the importance of energy conservation but
that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that the restriction be no more extensive than is necessary to serve the state inter114
est.” Thus, the ban on commercial speech at issue was unconstitutional because it was more extensive than necessary.
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 568–69.
Id.
Id. at 569.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 570.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570–71.
Id. at 571–72.
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C. Cases Interpreting the Central Hudson Test
Before Central Hudson, the concept of “commercial speech” was
illustrated in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy by the following proposi115
tion: “I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.”
The
Court, also prior to Central Hudson, stated that it takes a “common116
sense” view of commercial speech. The decision in Central Hudson
drastically broadened this viewpoint when the Court stated, “Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest
117
in the fullest possible dissemination of information.”
A speaker,
however, will not be able to circumvent commercial-speech status
simply by including “advertising that links a product to a current pub118
lic debate.”
In the years following Central Hudson, the Supreme
Court has considered—on several occasions—the threshold question
of what defines commercial speech.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Court rejected a challenge to the commercial-speech characterization of advertisements
119
discussing venereal disease and family planning. It quoted Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy for the proposition that commercial speech is
“speech which does no more than propose a commercial transac120
tion.”
But some limitations are placed on this earlier definition;
simply because material is conceded to be an advertisement does not
121
mean that it is commercial speech. Furthermore, an advertisement
is not necessarily commercial just because it references a specific
122
123
product or because it was motivated by economic gains. In Bolger,
the combination of all three of these ideas convinced the Court that
124
the advertising was commercial.
Similarly, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox, the Court held that intertwining commercial speech with noncommercial speech did not afford commercial speech the same level
115
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976).
116
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978).
117
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62.
118
Id. at 563 n.5.
119
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983).
120
Id. at 66 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 67.
124
Id.
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of protection that noncommercial speech receives.
If nothing in
the regulation at issue “prevents the speaker from conveying, or the
audience from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing
in the nature of things requires them to be combined with commer126
cial messages,” the Central Hudson test controls.
In addition to interpreting this threshold question, courts have
interpreted each of the four prongs of the Central Hudson test. As for
the first prong, the commercial speech must concern lawful activity
and must not be misleading. The Central Hudson Court noted that
127
inaccurate messages are not constitutionally protected. Courts may
regulate advertising that is inherently likely to be deceptive or that
128
has actually proved to deceive.
The second prong of the test deals with the government’s asserted interest underlying the regulation; the governmental interest
129
must be substantial. At least one circuit court has held that to find
an interest to be substantial the interest must be legitimate in theory
130
and must remedy a problem that in fact exists. Among those inter125

Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989).
Id. Some argue that the lower courts use the following three factors in deciding whether speech is commercial: (1) if the speech is an advertisement, (2) if the
speech refers to a specific product, and (3) if there is an economic motivation behind the speech. Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial Speech: A New Analytical Framework for the 21st Century, 44 AM. BUS. L. J. 127, 144 (2007).
127
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”); see
also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993).
128
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (“[R]egulation—and imposition of discipline—are permissible where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has
in fact been deceptive.”). See also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), in which the Court explained,
The advertisement makes no mention of the distinction between “legal
fees” and “costs,” and to a layman not aware of the meaning of these
terms of art, the advertisement would suggest that employing appellant
would be a no-lose proposition in that his representation in a losing
cause would come entirely free of charge. The assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients would be so misled is hardly a speculative one: it is a commonplace that members of the public are often
unaware of the technical meanings of such terms as “fees” and “costs”[]
....
Id. at 652.
129
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
130
Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996) (“To find a
‘substantial interest,’ a court must conclude both that the interest advanced by the
state is legitimate in theory, and that that interest is in remedying a problem that exists in fact (or probably would exist, but for the challenged legislation).”).
126
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ests that the Court has found to be substantial are traffic regula131
132
tions, aesthetic improvement, aesthetic preservation through the
133
134
135
reduction of litter,
temperance,
and energy conservation.
When a state takes a paternalistic view of a particular activity (that is,
when the government seeks to protect its citizens from something it
deems “bad” or to keep consumers in ignorance), the Court will like136
ly find no substantial interest.
The third prong asks whether the regulation directly advances
137
The regulation cannot advance the inthe governmental interest.
138
terest in an ineffective or remote way; rather, the regulation must
139
advance that interest in a direct and material way.
Moreover, the
government must prove that the harms at issue are real and that the
140
law will aid in alleviating those harms to a material degree.
The

131

Supersign of Boca Raton, Inc., v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 766 F.2d 1528, 1530
(11th Cir. 1985) (“The objectives served by the ordinance, traffic regulation and aesthetic improvement, undoubtedly qualify as substantial governmental interests.”).
132
Id.
133
Sciarrino, 83 F.3d at 367–68 (holding states have a substantial interest in “preserving aesthetics through the reduction of litter”).
134
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996).
135
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
568 (1980).
136
See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 510 (“[A] state legislature does not have the
broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic
purposes . . . .”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding that a state may not suppress lawful information
because it fears the effect that this information will have on the public). But see Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (“The legislature could conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by
widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct.”).
137
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
138
Id. at 564 (“[T]he regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.”); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc.,
517 U.S. at 504–05 (“In evaluating the ban’s effectiveness in advancing the State’s
interest, we note that a commercial speech regulation ‘may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.’” (quoting
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564)).
139
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (“[W]e must ask whether the
State’s interests in proscribing [the speech] are substantial, whether the challenged
regulation advances these interests in a direct and material way . . . .”); see also Rubin
v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767).
140
Edenfield, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993) (“[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”); see
also 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 505; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486.
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government can meet this burden by reference to studies and anec141
dotal evidence.
Under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test the regulation
must not be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted in142
terest. The Court has limited the fit not to one of perfection but to
143
one of reasonableness and narrow tailoring. Even though the least144
restrictive-means test does not necessarily apply here, finding means
of achieving the same goal without limiting speech may serve as evi145
dence that the restriction is more extensive than necessary.
IV. THE LAWN LITTER LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Lawn Litter Law is unconstitutional under a Central Hudson
analysis; thus, the court should strike it down if the legislature leaves
it unamended. The speech that this law seeks to regulate is clearly
commercial. This speech concerns lawful activity, which, under the
first prong of the Central Hudson test, is subject to regulation. But although the City proposes five interests to justify its restriction of
commercial speech, none of these interests satisfies all four prongs of
141
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (“We have permitted
litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether . . . .” (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515
U.S. 618, 628 (1995))).
142
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
143
Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (“What
our decisions require is a . . . fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; . . .
that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 556.
144
See Went for It, 515 U.S. at 632 (“[W]e made clear that the ‘least restrictive
means’ test has no role in the commercial speech context.” (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at
480)).
145
See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (“In previous
cases addressing this final prong of the Central Hudson test, we have made clear that if
the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech,
or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (“[I]f there are numerous and
obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is
certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends and
means is reasonable.”). Notably, the Central Hudson test, although instructive, is vague and leads to discrepancies in its results because the standard is applied differently. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 5
(2000); see also Emily Erickson, Disfavored Advertising: Telemarketing, Junk Faxes and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 589, 620 (2006). Furthermore, some
have even suggested that the doctrine be eliminated entirely. See Lorillard, 533 U.S.
at 554 (noting that several litigants have suggested to the Supreme Court that the
Central Hudson standard be discarded in favor of applying strict scrutiny). Nonetheless, Central Hudson has never been overruled by a majority of the Court. See, e.g., 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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the analysis; all fail at least one prong. For these reasons, the City
may not regulate commercial speech as set out in current version of
the Lawn Litter Law.
A. The Speech that the Lawn Litter Law Seeks to Regulate Is
Commercial
The crux of the Lawn Litter Law is that “unsolicited papers,
fliers, pamphlets, handbills, circulars, or other materials advertising a
business or soliciting business” are unlawful when the owner of a private property has posted a sign prohibiting advertisers from distribut146
ing such materials on the property.
The materials that the Lawn
Litter Law addresses have consistently been within First Amendment
147
Handbills and fliers are essential to those businesses
protection.
that lack the financial resources to conduct an advertising campaign
148
on a grand scale.
This Comment will illustrate the unconstitutionality of the Lawn Litter Law by using the example of a takeout
menu, which is a type of advertisement that businesses frequently
149
leave on private property in New York City. Takeout menus certainly come within the meaning of commercial speech as defined by the
150
Supreme Court. Although references to a product or an economic
motivation are not conclusive proof that an advertisement constitutes
151
commercial speech, the Supreme Court has stated a common-sense
152
For exapproach must be used to determine commercial speech.
ample, a takeout menu is an advertisement that refers to specific
153
products with an economic motivation behind the speech. As long
as the DSNY will interpret the Lawn Litter Law to apply to takeout
menus, the speech in such a menu will come under the commercial
154
speech protections as defined in Central Hudson. This leads to the
conclusion that takeout menus are examples of commercial speech
and that any regulation prohibiting them is subject to analysis under
Central Hudson.

146

N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 397-a(1) (CONSOL. 2007 & SUPP. 2009).
See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (noting that the
distribution of literature consistently receives First Amendment protection).
148
Id. at 146 (“Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.”).
149
See Chan, supra note 63, at B1.
150
See supra notes 115–124 and accompanying text.
151
Id.
152
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978).
153
See Sprague, supra note 126, at 144.
154
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
147
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B. Regulating Takeout Menus Satisfies the First Prong of the Central
Hudson Test
Takeout menus are examples of commercial speech subject to
regulation under the first prong of the Central Hudson test that states
that the regulated speech must concern lawful activity and must not
155
be misleading. A typical restaurant’s takeout menu concerns lawful
activity (selling food) and is likely not misleading (providing it gives
156
accurate price and fee information). Without question, states have
the authority to regulate commercial speech that is misleading or
fraudulent, and the aim of this Comment is not to suggest other157
wise.
Any unsolicited advertising that is misleading or fraudulent,
regardless of whether it violates the Lawn Litter Law, is not afforded
First Amendment protection—no issue of constitutionality arises.
New York is free to prohibit as it sees fit any unsolicited advertising
that is misleading, fraudulent, or advertises an illegal activity. Because takeout menus concern lawful activity and are usually not misleading, the State and City of New York may regulate them. But before either the City or the State regulates these menus, it must satisfy
all prongs of the Central Hudson test.
C. The Government Has a Substantial Interest in Regulating Takeout
Menus
The second prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the
governmental interest in regulating the commercial speech be sub158
stantial.
The Governor’s Memorandum asserts two state interests
for the Lawn Litter Law: protecting citizens against the annoyance
and inconvenience of unsolicited advertisements and protecting the
environment from litter caused by the distribution of materials that
159
are either unwanted or unsecured. In its proposal to adopt the law,
the DSNY merged the Governor’s interests with its own and set out in
its Statement of Basis and Purpose five reasons for the law: reducing
litter, preventing crime, securing its citizens’ safety, protecting its citi160
zens from nuisance, and protecting its citizens’ privacy. This Com155

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
156
See id.
157
Id. at 563 (“[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”).
158
Id. at 566.
159
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
160
See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 4–5.
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ment proposes that the five interests set out in the DSNY’s statement
do not satisfy the Central Hudson test.
1.

The City Does Not Have a Substantial Interest in
Reducing Litter

The City asserts that unsolicited advertisements can blow away in
161
the wind and accumulate as litter on streets and sidewalks. Keeping
the City clean is obviously an appropriate governmental interest, but
the Court has held that protecting a city from litter is not a sufficient
162
reason to abrogate First Amendment protection. The Court established that “[t]he short, though regular, journey from mail box to
trash can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitu163
tion is concerned.”
Thus, the City’s interest in reducing and preventing litter cannot be deemed substantial. The City, therefore,
does not meet this prong of the Central Hudson test.
2.

The City Has a Substantial Interest in Preventing Crime

The City’s interest in protecting its citizens from crime satisfies
the second prong of the Central Hudson test. Unsolicited materials
can accumulate on private property when residents are away and
create a potential for crime. The fear is that burglars will notice the
buildup of unwanted advertisements on the property and realize that
no one is at home, which will thus make the property an easy target
164
for burglary.
Indeed, the DSNY concluded that the accumulation
of unsolicited advertisements increases the potential for criminal ac161

See id. at 4.
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). The Court explained its
position as follows:
We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of
good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits
a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one
willing to receive it. Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in
cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such
distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom
of speech and press.
Id. But see Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 367–68 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The
state’s interest here is in preserving aesthetics through the reduction of litter.”); Supersign of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Fort Lauderdale, 766 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985)
(finding that aesthetic improvement is a substantial governmental interest). But the
City, which bears the burden of proof, has not asserted aesthetics as a goal.
163
Lamont v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y 1967).
164
See Doherty, supra note 3 (“As [unsolicited advertising material] piles up while
the homeowner is away on vacation, this material does its job in an unexpected way,
‘advertising’ the fact that no one’s home, giving would-be robbers the green light to
come in and help themselves.”).
162
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165

tivity. Concededly, the state has a substantial interest in protecting
166
its citizens from crime.
3.

The City Has a Substantial Interest in Securing its
Citizens’ Safety

Unsolicited advertisements can accumulate in front of homes
and in the lobbies of apartment buildings. The DSNY suggests that
this causes a safety hazard to the residents and visitors because “[t]he
materials, when wet or covered with snow and ice, may cause a person
167
to slip and fall.”
The state has a substantial interest in protecting
168
the safety of its residents.
4.

The City Does Not Have a Substantial Interest in
Protecting its Citizens from Nuisance

Unsolicited advertisements can be a nuisance for those who do
not want them but still must dispose of them. “[T]he Court has consistently recognized a municipality’s power to protect its citizens
169
from . . . undue annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing.”
But the fact that courts recognize a municipality’s power to protect its
citizens does not necessarily mean that protecting citizens from nuis170
ance is a substantial interest. The Court has also held that disposing
of an unwanted advertisement is a small, tolerable cost of protecting
171
free speech.
Protecting citizens from nuisance resulting from the
distribution of unsolicited advertisements is paternalistic; therefore,
165

See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 4–5.
Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616–17 (1976) (“[T]he
Court has consistently recognized a municipality’s power to protect its citizens from
crime and undue annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing.”).
167
See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 5.
168
See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995); Posadas de P.R.
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
169
Hynes, 425 U.S. at 616–17; see also Pa. Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of
Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1984). But see Ohio Citizen Action v. City of
Mentor-On-The-Lake, 272 F. Supp. 2d 671, 685 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“While the government’s interest in minimizing annoyance is legitimate, it is not, in and of itself,
compelling enough to form the basis for a content-based restriction on free
speech.”).
170
See Ohio Citizen Action, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
171
Consol. Edison v. Pub. Srvc. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (“The customer of Consolidated Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by
transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.”); Lamont v. Comm’r of
Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“The short, though regular,
journey from mail box to trash can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the
Constitution is concerned.”); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 72 (1983).
166
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the Court is not likely to uphold it as a substantial interest. Thus,
nuisance is not a substantial government interest and does not satisfy
the second prong of the Central Hudson test.
5.

The City Does Not Have a Substantial Interest in
Protecting its Citizens’ Privacy

The City proposes that unsolicited advertisements invade the
privacy of those who do not wish to receive this commercial informa173
tion. But a substantial invasion of a citizen’s privacy interest must ex174
ist before the government can intervene. When the Court has held
privacy to be a substantial state interest, the government sought to
protect its citizens from substantial harms associated with the abridge175
Nothing about the subject matter here (takeout
ment of privacy.
food) would substantially harm the privacy of citizens. That is, business advertisements do not substantially interfere with the privacy
rights of citizens—the burden imposed on the recipient is minimal,
the advertiser takes away no personal information, and the advertisement is not even addressed to a specific person. The First
Amendment right of businesses should not give way when the harm
(if any) to citizens is minimal and fails to constitute a substantial inva176
sion of their privacy.
Thus, although privacy can be a substantial
governmental interest, in this context, it is not because business ad-

172

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 5.
174
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”).
175
See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620–25 (1995) (upholding
thirty-day ban on attorneys contacting victims of accidents via direct-mail solicitation
because it is an intrusion on privacy); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767–69 (1993)
(holding that protecting the privacy of potential accounting clients is a substantial
interest); Carey v. Brown 447 U.S. 455, 457, 471 (1980) (holding that protecting the
sanctity of the home is substantial interest where picketers were protesting in front of
mayor’s home); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 730–31 (1970)
(upholding statute that allows mail recipient to elect not to receive what he thinks of
as “erotically arousing or sexually provocative” material because of privacy concerns
(quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964 Supp. IV))).
176
Consol. Edison v. Pub. Srvc. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (“The customer of Consolidated Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by
transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket.”); Lamont, 269 F. Supp. at
883 (“The short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned.”); see also Bolger, 463 U.S.
at 72 (“[W]e have never held that the government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended.”).
173
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vertisements are not harmful and do not substantially invade citizens’
privacy interests.
D. The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance All of the City’s
Asserted Interests
The Central Hudson test requires any law limiting commercial
speech to directly advance the government’s interest in regulating it.
The Lawn Litter Law only directly advances the City’s asserted interest in reducing litter. The law does not directly advance the asserted
interests in preventing crime, securing its citizens’ safety, protecting
its Citizens from nuisance, or protecting its citizens’ privacy and,
therefore, fails the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
1.

The Lawn Litter Law Directly Advances the City’s Goal
of Litter Reduction

The reduction of litter is not a substantial governmental interest. But for purposes of argument, this Comment supposes that the
government has a substantial interest in eliminating litter that the law
may directly advance. The Lawn Litter Law may reduce the number
of advertising materials that businesses distribute. This is best illustrated in the case of one-, two-, and three-family homes where the
owner displays a “no solicitation” sign. In such a circumstance, the
Lawn Litter Law mandates that no business may place unsolicited advertising materials at the residence; the owner has complete discretion to ban all advertising materials from the property. That is, the
law does not require one-, two-, and three-family homes to provide a
space for advertisers to leave materials if residents other than the
owner wish to receive the materials. To conclude that that Lawn Litter Law has directly advanced the government’s goal of reducing litter, it is necessary to assume that if such a sign is not posted by the
owner of a one-, two-, or three-family home, any advertising left at
that property will necessarily contribute to street litter.
The difficulty arises, however, with multiple-dwelling buildings
to which a significant drop in the number of distributed advertising
materials may not occur. The law requires that owners of multiple178
unit buildings obtain permission from every single owner or lessee
to completely prohibit unsolicited advertisements on the property. If
at least one owner or lessee does not agree to the prohibition, the
177

177

See supra Part IV.C.i.
In New York City, apartment buildings may have different ownership structures, such as cooperatives, condominiums, or rentals. This Comment uses the term
owner or lessee to refer to the inhabitants of apartments within multi-unit buildings.
178
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owner or manager of the building is required to designate a place for
these materials. While the designated location may be a place of
temporary confinement for the materials, businesses may nonetheless
deposit too many materials therein. If such documents are not frequently removed (whether by the owners who want this material or by
the building’s management), the risk of these advertisements becoming litter on the streets is just as high as if no regulation was in place
at all. So in that respect, the law does not directly advance the government’s interest. Moreover, the government must show that the
placement of unsolicited materials on private property leads directly
179
to litter. The Lawn Litter Law aids in alleviating litter to a material
degree but only to the extent that property owners elect to prohibit
180
such materials.
Therefore, although the regulation directly advances the asserted interest because of the possibility that unwanted
advertisements will blow away and contribute to street litter, this direct advancement is entirely dependent on citizens’ decision to prohibit the advertising materials.
2.

The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance the
City’s Interest in Deterring Crime

To satisfy the Central Hudson test, the City must show that the
Lawn Litter Law directly advances the deterrence of crime. Even
though deterring crime is a substantial state interest, prohibiting un181
solicited advertising materials does not directly advance it.
If the
advancement of the interest is only remote, it does not comply with
182
Central Hudson.
Allowing owners to prohibit takeout menus on
their property only advances the goal of deterring crime in the most
remote way. If the City can point to no evidence that the buildup of
183
advertising materials leads to burglary, a court will not find that the
184
interest directly advances crime prevention. Furthermore, the pro179
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71 n.20 (“The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.”); Carroll v. City of Detroit, 410 F.
Supp. 2d 615, 623 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“Because the original ordinance contains no
statement of purpose and the City has provided no extrinsic evidence of its substantial governmental interest in enacting the original ordinance, the ordinance fails to
meet an essential element of the Central Hudson test and is, therefore, unconstitutional.”).
180
See supra note 140.
181
Cf. Pa. Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 187 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that ban on door-to-door canvassing after dark directly advances
interest in deterring crime).
182
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
183
See supra note 179.
184
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995).
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hibition of advertisements does not deter burglary to a material de185
gree, as the law requires. If the City wants to deter crime, it should
186
“vigorously enforce its criminal statutes” instead of infringing on
the constitutional right to free speech. Thus, the government’s asserted interest in deterring crime fails the third prong of the Central
Hudson test.
3.

The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance the
City’s Goal of Securing its Citizens’ Safety

As with deterring crime, only a weak connection exists between
keeping citizens safe and allowing for the prohibition of unsolicited
business advertisements. To withstand the Central Hudson analysis,
the regulation must advance the interest in a material way. Here,
prohibiting only business advertisements does not alleviate the harm
187
to citizens’ safety to a material degree.
Although residents or visitors might slip and fall because of these unsolicited materials, the possibility of this occurring is too remote to entirely abridge the First
188
Amendment right to commercial speech.
Furthermore, the law
does not cover other forms of protected speech; businesses may still
distribute handbills that can accumulate on private property and pose
the same risk to safety as takeout menus. The law does not directly
advance the safety interest because in singling out business advertising, it excludes all other forms of speech and the alleged danger such
advertisements cause. An unsolicited pamphlet proposing a particular candidate for office poses the exact same threat to citizens’ safety
as a takeout menu might. A citizen will be no safer simply because
business advertisements are prohibited from private property. Nothing is inherently dangerous about business advertising distributed in
this method when compared to all other forms of speech distributed
in the same manner.
Thus, the evidence that business advertisements (as opposed to
all other speech) place citizens in harm’s way is tenuous at best. This
is critical to the third prong of the analysis because the regulation
189
must materially advance the City’s interest in safety. If only a remote
chance exists for the Lawn Litter Law to protect citizens, the law must

185

See supra note 139.
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 356 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
187
See supra note 140.
188
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
189
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
186
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190

be struck down.
Prohibiting unsolicited business advertising from
distribution on private property does not materially increase citizens’
safety because other types of speech that businesses distribute in this
manner are just as likely to pose a safety risk. Therefore, the regulation does not directly advance the government’s interest in safety.
4.

The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance the
City’s Interest in Protecting Its Citizens from Nuisance

Even if protecting citizens from nuisance qualified as a substantial interest, the Lawn Litter Law does not directly advance it. Citizens will still be subject to the same “nuisance” from protected speech
that businesses distribute by handbill or flier. Thus, the prohibition
of business advertising does not materially advance the interest in
eliminating nuisance because unsolicited advertisements that are not
business related (like political fliers of campaign information or protest announcements) are just as likely to annoy citizens as are commercial advertisements. Moreover, nothing indicates that allowing
citizens to prohibit business advertisements will alleviate nuisance in a
material way.
For owners of one-, two-, or three-unit properties, the law advances to some degree the goal of eliminating nuisance to property
owners. In these situations, the owner of the building has authority
to prohibit the materials from the property and thus eliminate nuisance to all residents. But with respect to multi-unit residences, the
law requires permission from all owners or lessees to prohibit these
191
materials. If an owner or lessee withholds permission, the owner of
the building must designate a place for businesses to secure the de192
Although the law specifies that advertisers must
sired materials.
place materials in one spot, having the advertisements in the building
is arguably still a nuisance to many residents; once the designated location is full of papers, someone must deal with it. Furthermore, if
owners or lessees want to take materials out of the pile, they could inadvertently drop some of the ads—creating the exact problem that
the Lawn Litter Law seeks to redress. It is probably more of a nuisance for the owner or manager of such properties to go door to door
asking whether a specific tenant wishes to prohibit advertisements. It
190
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980) (“[T]he regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or
remote support for the government’s purpose.”); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996).
191
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
192
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.

LEONARD FINAL FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

11/8/2010 4:14 PM

COMMENT

1801

may also be an annoyance to update the sign each time a new tenant
moves into the building. Finally, the procedures for reporting a violation of the Lawn Litter Law may be more trouble than they are
worth even without the requirement that the application be nota193
rized. The Lawn Litter Law does not directly or materially advance
the goal of reducing nuisance and thus does not satisfy the third
prong of the Central Hudson test.
5.

The Lawn Litter Law Does Not Directly Advance the
City’s Interest in Protecting Its Citizens’ Privacy

Unsolicited advertising materials are not a substantial invasion of
privacy, but even conceding that privacy in this instance could be a
substantial state interest, allowing owners to prohibit unsolicited advertising materials does not directly advance the goal of protecting
privacy. The law only prohibits business-advertising materials; it does
nothing to prohibit other types of unsolicited speech from private
property. Thus, the law does not materially advance the City’s interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens. In terms of privacy, no
material difference exists between commercial and non-commercial
speech that is not inherently harmful. In sum, the prohibition on
business advertising does not directly advance the City’s asserted interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens.
Furthermore, there are ways to get around the law—business advertisers can simply place “more than a deminimus amount of news
194
[and] publish[] [it] at least weekly” for exemption from liability.
For example, a restaurant could simply insert a short section at the
top of its takeout menu that gives an account of the restaurant’s previous week’s activities or of events taking place in the community. As
long as the restaurant publishes its takeout menu as modified on a
weekly basis, it will be outside the purview of the Lawn Litter Law. As
such, the menus could continue to be just as problematic (as defined
by the City’s interests) as they were before the law passed. The problem could actually become worse because to circumvent the law, restaurants would have to publish weekly; before, restaurants may have
been publishing and delivering their menus less frequently. This is
entirely contrary to the purpose of the Lawn Litter Law and is evidence that the law does not directly advance the City’s goals.

193

See Lombardi, supra note 61, at 53.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text. But the addition of this type of information would not necessarily bring the advertisement within the realm of full First
Amendment protection. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
194
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E. The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary
To satisfy the fourth and final prong of the Central Hudson test,
the Lawn Litter Law must not be more extensive than necessary in
195
advancing the interests of the government. The Lawn Litter Law is,
however, more extensive than necessary in advancing each of the
City’s five asserted interests, which are reducing litter, preventing
crime, securing its citizens’ safety, protecting its citizens from nuisance, and protecting its citizens’ privacy. Thus, the Lawn Litter Law
fails the Central Hudson test, and is unconstitutional.
1.

The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary
in Reducing Litter

Obviously, not every single piece of business advertising becomes
litter. By allowing property owners to ban the placement of all business advertisements, this law is much more extensive than necessary.
A blanket prohibition on the distribution of all unsolicited business
advertisements is not a narrowly tailored way to achieve a reduction
196
in litter.
Although a showing of the least restrictive means is not
the test, a court will consider in its analysis whether numerous less re197
Methods
strictive ways to accomplish the government’s goal exist.
unrelated to limiting speech can be used to achieve the government’s
interest in this scenario. First, the City could fine a business if its advertisements actually ended up on the streets as litter. This option
would encourage businesses to be careful about how they distribute
their fliers. Second, the City could require all property owners to designate and maintain a secure place for unsolicited advertising to assure that no materials become litter. This would both directly advance the interest of the government and not be more extensive than
necessary. Finally, New York City already has litter laws that adequately address street litter. The City could put more effort into
doing its job of maintaining a clean environment by enforcing its existing laws as opposed to passing new ones that restrict protected
198
speech.
Whereas the Lawn Litter Law as it stands now only ad195

Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
197
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
198
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 31, § 753(a)(1)–(2) (2004), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/citycharter2004.pdf.
The law
states that
the commissioner shall have charge and control of and be responsible
for all those functions and operations of the city relating to the cleanliness of the streets and the disposal of waste, including, without limitation, the following: (1) the sweeping, cleaning . . . of the streets; (2) the
196
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vances the City’s interest if the property owner elects to prohibit the
advertising materials, these less restrictive methods are not subject to
an individual citizen’s unilateral decision to prohibit the advertisements and, thereby, more directly advance the government’s interest.
Thus, because other ways to advance the government’s goals of reducing litter without encroaching on a business’s First Amendment
rights exist, the regulation at issue is more extensive than necessary.
2.

The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary
in Preventing Crime

Allowing property owners to elect to ban all business advertising
is much more extensive than necessary because not all such material,
199
when left on property, leads directly to crime, such as burglary. No
direct connection exists between business advertisements (as opposed
to all other types of advertisements) and burglaries. Although the
possibility of the law actually preventing burglaries is remote, the cost
to hundreds of businesses is certain: their First Amendment rights
will suffer, and they will sustain substantial economic losses. The law
is overbroad because the connection between crime and business advertising accumulating on property is too attenuated. The Lawn Litter Law is more extensive than necessary because it prevents the distribution of many more advertisements than it prevents criminal
200
activity. Alternatively, requiring all property owners to designate a
place for unsolicited advertisements will significantly reduce the possibility of piled-up materials causing a burglary. Also, the City could
increase police patrols in areas where burglaries are likely to occur or
even require those patrolling to pay special heed to the properties
that have accumulated a significant number of unsolicited advertise201
ments. With other options available to protect citizens from crime
without impinging on the First Amendment, the Lawn Litter Law is
more extensive than necessary in advancing the City’s asserted interest in preventing burglaries.

removal and disposition of . . . street sweepings, garbage, refuse, rubbish and waste.
Id.
199
200
201

See DEP’T OF SANITATION, supra note 58, at 4.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary
in Securing Citizens’ Safety

Not every single business advertisement is a safety hazard. In
fact, not more than a very small number of unsolicited business advertisements actually cause physical injury. Thus, prohibiting all such
advertisements from private property is not a reasonable way of
202
achieving the government’s interest. As the law is written, a reasonable requirement to promote safety is that owners of multi-unit buildings designate a special location for advertisements for the benefit of
owners or lessees who do not want to prohibit such materials outright. But allowing owners to prohibit all or even a portion of these
advertisements from their property to secure a minimal level of safety
for the inhabitants is too restrictive. If in the name of safety, the government wants to require some owners to designate a place for the
materials to go, it should require all owners to do the same. Requiring everyone to designate a place for advertisements would allow for a
reasonable fit. Allowing the total prohibition of these materials is
more restrictive than necessary and not a narrow fit in light of the
fact that designating a place for them will eliminate the hazard that
the government seeks to address.
4.

The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary
in Protecting Citizens from Nuisance

Even if nuisance was a substantial governmental interest that this
regulation directly advanced, the Lawn Litter Law is still problematic
because it is more extensive than necessary. The law is narrowly tailored in terms of allowing those citizens who live in multi-unit dwellings to choose whether they want to receive unsolicited advertising.
This means that residents who are annoyed by unsolicited advertisements can ban them, but those who are not annoyed by the advertisements still have the opportunity to receive them. Although it may
still be a nuisance to those who want to prohibit unsolicited advertising to deal with the designated, conspicuous location where businesses will place the ads for the benefit of those who do want them, this
part of the law is not more extensive than necessary. But in terms of
reducing the nuisance of those people living in owner-occupied twoand three-family homes, this law is more extensive than necessary. In
this case, the power to prohibit the advertising materials is vested
solely in the owner of the building. The other families living in the
building may not find unsolicited advertising a nuisance, but they
202

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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have no say in whether to prohibit such materials at their residence.
Moreover, other families may find the advertisements to be a nuisance but have no power to prohibit them because the families do not
own the building. In conclusion, for the asserted governmental interest in alleviating nuisance, this law is partially narrowly tailored
and partially more extensive than necessary.
5.

The Lawn Litter Law Is More Extensive than Necessary
in Protecting Its Citizens’ Privacy

Privacy only justifies prohibiting speech if the speech is harmful.
Here, arbitrarily prohibiting speech that is not necessarily
harmful is more extensive than necessary. The law is not narrowly tailored because virtually all of these advertisements are not harmful; by
definition, they simply propose a price for goods or services. The
government cannot allow citizens to ban all commercial advertising
simply because of the possibility that some of the advertisements will
be harmful to citizens’ privacy interests, which are already sufficiently
protected; if a particular advertisement is harmful, the First Amendment will not impede citizens’ efforts to ban it. But the fear of such
harm cannot justify the abridgement of businesses’ First Amendment
right to advertise. This is a paternalistic view of the issue that a court
204
will likely not accept.
As with nuisance, this law is more extensive
than necessary in protecting the purported privacy interests of those
who live in owner-occupied two- and three-family homes. Only the
owner has the power to prohibit unsolicited advertising; if the owner
does so, the other families in that building do not have the option of
obtaining unsolicited advertisements. Thus, with respect to the City’s
interest in protecting its citizens’ privacy, the Lawn Litter Law is more
extensive than necessary.
203

V. AMENDING THE LAWN LITTER LAW
If New York City truly wants to reduce litter brought on by business advertising, it should amend the Lawn Litter Law to simply fine
those businesses whose advertisements actually end up on the street
as litter. For example, the amendment could read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any representative of a business entity to
cause or permit any unsolicited papers, fliers, pamphlets, handbills, circulars, or other materials advertising a business or soliciting business to become litter. Any instance of any unsolicited ad-

203
204

See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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vertising material becoming litter shall be punishable by a fine
not to exceed $100.

Amending the law in this way would allow it to survive a constitutional
attack under Central Hudson. Moreover, the law would more directly
serve the City’s interest in reducing the amount of litter on the
streets. By levying a fine against those businesses whose advertising
materials actually become litter, the Lawn Litter Law as amended
would deter businesses from carelessly distributing their advertisements.
At the outset, the City may regulate business advertising, such as
205
takeout menus, because they are commercial in nature. Thus, the
Central Hudson framework applies and allows for the regulation of this
speech if all four prongs of the test are met. Assuming that the takeout menus convey content that is lawful and not misleading, the
206
first prong of Central Hudson is satisfied.
For the purposes of argument, this Comment has assumed that
207
the reduction of litter could be a substantial governmental interest.
Furthermore, if this interest in the reduction of litter were recharacterized as an interest in preserving aesthetics, the City would have an
interest that would most likely withstand analysis under the first
208
prong of the Central Hudson test.
Thus, as a starting proposition,
the City may regulate business advertising, including takeout menus,
based on its interest in reducing litter and preserving aesthetic appearances.
The next issue that the City faces is that any regulation that it
209
imposes must directly advance its interest in preserving aesthetics.
If the Lawn Litter Law imposed a fine on any business whose advertisements actually became litter, the City would be able to directly advance its goal of preserving aesthetics. Everyone can agree that litter
is not aesthetically pleasing. Imposing a fine on businesses that leave
on private property unsolicited advertisements that then become litter would serve as a deterrent to those businesses. The fine would deter careless distribution of advertising materials while removing the
205

See supra part IV.A.
See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
207
See supra part IV.D.i.
208
Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 367–68 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that states have a substantial interest in “preserving aesthetics through the reduction
of litter”); Supersign of Boca Raton, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 76 F.2d 1528,
1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The objectives served by the ordinance, traffic regulation
and aesthetic improvement, undoubtedly qualify as substantial governmental interests.”).
209
See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.
206
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prohibition on these materials that the current Lawn Litter Law allows. This deterrent would thus become an effective way to serve the
interest in aesthetic preservation because it would target only those
210
who actually litter. Moreover, the regulation would not advance the
goal in a remote way; a direct connection would exist between the lit211
ter on the ground and the business that is fined.
Thus, by fining
based on actual litter, the amended regulation would directly advance the goal of aesthetic preservation.
Finally, the amendment to the Lawn Litter Law must not be
212
more extensive than necessary in serving the interest in aesthetics.
By fining only those businesses whose advertisements actually become
litter, the amendment would satisfy this standard. If the City were to
use this deterrent method as opposed to the prohibition method currently in force, it could pinpoint exactly the problem that it faces.
That is, by fining those businesses that actually litter, the City would
be punishing only those businesses that are causing the problem. Of
course, a recipient of an advertisement could inadvertently drop a
properly secured advertisement on the ground. This may lead to inconsistent results, but to satisfy this prong of the Central Hudson test,
the regulation need only be reasonable—not perfect—in addressing
213
the solution the City desires. Moreover, even if a fine arose because
of a recipient rather than the business itself, it would further serve
the City’s goal in preserving aesthetics because that business would be
even more careful in how and where it distributes its advertisements.
Thus, this amendment would make the Lawn Litter Law not more extensive than necessary to achieve the City’s goal of aesthetic preservation.
Amending the Lawn Litter Law to act as a deterrent instead of
an outright prohibition would put the burden on businesses to ensure that their advertisements are not causing the problem that the
law seeks to remedy. Furthermore, this amendment would take away
the City’s ability to allow residents to categorically exclude such advertising from their property. A law that acts as a deterrent instead of
a prohibition would remind businesses that their right to freedom of
speech is not absolute and would ensure that businesses remain responsible for their advertisements, but at the same time prevent the
City from trammeling their free speech rights. It would then become
the responsibility of the City rather than the residents to collect evi210
211
212
213

See supra note 138.
Id.
See supra note 142.
See supra note 143.
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dence of any violation. This is fair for two reasons. First, the City
wants to restrict commercial speech, and as such, the City should
have the burden to bring up violations. Second, the City has the responsibility to maintain “the cleanliness of the streets and the dispos214
al of waste.”
Thus, not only would this amendment be fairer to
businesses in terms of not categorically excluding this mode of
speech, it would also be fairer in terms of allocating responsibility of
enforcement to the government because the government is the one
seeking to impose this regulation.
If the legislature amended the Lawn Litter Law to simply fine
the businesses that actually litter, the law would pass muster under
the Central Hudson test. The City has a substantial interest in preserving aesthetics, the amendment would directly advance this goal, and
the amendment would not be more extensive than necessary in
achieving this interest. Thus, although that Lawn Litter Law is likely
unconstitutional, this recommended amendment would allow the
City to regulate business advertising in a way that is fairer both to the
government and to businesses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Lawn Litter Law seeks to prohibit unsolicited advertising
from private property. This law, as adopted by New York City, is an
unconstitutional abridgement of commercial speech in violation of
the First Amendment that the legislature should amend lest the law
fall under constitutional scrutiny. Advertising materials that are
commonly distributed on private property in New York City, such as
takeout menus, fall within the definition of commercial speech because they propose commercial transactions. Any restriction of
commercial speech is subject to analysis within the framework set out
in Central Hudson, which requires that for nonmisleading speech, the
government must assert a substantial interest. Furthermore, the regulation at issue must directly advance the interest and must not be
more extensive than necessary.
For each of its asserted interests (reducing litter, preventing
crime, securing its citizens’ safety, protecting its citizens from nuisance, or protecting its citizens’ privacy), the City fails the Central Hudson test on at least one of the prongs. The City’s interest in keeping
litter from the streets is not substantial. Even if it were, the Lawn Litter Law does not directly advance this interest and is more extensive
than necessary. Although preventing crime is obviously a substantial
214

See supra note 196.
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City interest, the regulation does not directly advance this interest
and is more extensive than necessary. Furthermore, while the City
has a substantial interest in keeping its citizens safe, the Lawn Litter
Law does not directly advance this interest and is more extensive than
necessary. Preventing nuisance is not a substantial City interest.
Even if it were, though, the law does not directly advance this interest,
and it is only partially narrowly tailored. Finally, the City has a substantial interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens but only from
substantial harm. The regulated speech here is not harmful. The law
does not directly advance the City’s interest in privacy and is only partially reasonably tailored. Thus, because each of the City’s asserted
interests fails on at least one of the test’s prongs, the Lawn Litter Law
is an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech.
In conclusion, New York City’s Lawn Litter Law is unconstitutional because it restricts constitutionally protected commercial
speech. The City should not prohibit protected speech in this manner. The right to freedom of speech is a fundamental tenet of our
democracy that the government cannot impede with impunity. In
Central Hudson, the Supreme Court explicitly delineated the criteria
that the government must meet before it can restrict commercial
speech. The City does not meet all of these criteria; none of its five
interests withstands scrutiny under all four prongs of the Central Hudson test. Therefore, the City of New York’s regulation of business advertising as set out in the Lawn Litter Law is unconstitutional. The
New York Legislature should amend the law. If left unamended, the
law must be struck down.

